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Over the past two decades the Population Council has amassed a wealth of information on the causes and correlates of child marriage and documented its adverse effects on the wellbeing 
of women and girls. In many parts of the developing world, under-
standing child marriage is central to designing programs that promote 
healthy transitions to adulthood. Council research also underscores 
the importance of rituals and practices of marriage exchange around 
the globe and documents the considerable variation in these practices. 
This brief synthesizes some broad themes that have emerged from 
research on the costs of marriage. Even as customs such as dowry 
capture popular imagination and media attention, there is surprisingly 
little academic research or empirical evidence to inform judgment for 
effective programs and policy.  
Marriage Transactions
Marriage transactions are payments or transfer of property that occur 
between families of the bride and groom during the time of a marriage. 
The form, direction, and scale of payments vary widely. In some set-
tings, such as in Hindu or Sikh communities in Nepal or North India, 
negotiations about such payments are accepted practice; among 
Muslims in South Asia, on the other hand, the emergence of dowry 
demands has raised ire and alarm.  The anthropological classic Bride-
wealth and Dowry (Goody and Tambiah 1973) provides simple but 
authoritative definitions of these transactions as follows: 
Dowry: Transfers that flow from the bride’s family to the 
groom’s family. 
Bridewealth/brideprice: Transfers that flow from the groom’s 
family to the bride’s family. 
Beyond these are a host of other exchanges that take place dur-
ing marriages. These may include the provision of services and the 
exchange of gifts or of sisters/daughters between families. While not 
overt economic transactions, these exchanges often have an underly-
ing economic exchange function. Social scientists who study marriage 
exchange typically focus on trying to understand why transactions exist 
(e.g., Caldwell, Reddy, and Caldwell 1983; Becker 1991; Bhat and Halli 
1999). However, the full range of consequences of marriage transac-
tions is not well understood. Population Council work with adolescent 
girls suggests that along with the timing of marriage or practices such 
as child marriage, costs of marriage may have important implications 
for postmarital wellbeing and intimate-partner violence. In particular, 
the evaluation of women’s and men’s worth in the marriage market in 
terms of dowry or brideprice may have important consequences for 
sa
ge
ne
xt
.c
om
/2
01
0/
07
/p
ag
e/
5/
2     •    Visit www.popcouncil.org/publications/serialsbriefs/TABriefs.asp for all briefs in the Promoting healthy, safe, and productive transitions to adulthood series. 
their self-esteem and sense of self-worth, with significant implications 
for their wellbeing as adults and for gender equity. Yet, the evidence 
base on the consequences of the economic costs of marriage remains 
extremely weak. 
Static traditions versus changing practices
There is good reason to believe that it is discontinuities in practices, and 
changes in expectations that are at issue rather than established and 
long-standing traditions. It is now well established that the costs of mar-
riage have escalated in a wide range of settings. In a series of rigorous 
data assessments, the advent of dowry or its escalation over the past 
several decades has been linked to marriage squeeze (the excess of 
marriageable girls relative to boys). This is particularly well documented 
in South Asia. In Bangladesh and India the timing of rising dowry de-
mands coincides with high rates of population growth, which, combined 
with a cultural preference for large age differences in marriage favoring 
grooms, creates an imbalance in the marriage market. 
In many settings, costs of weddings have grown prohibitively expen-
sive, with expenses totaling several times the total annual household 
income. This cost escalation may be attributed to rising aspirations and 
rising standards of living. When such expectations are not met, these 
practices have been linked to various negative influences on women’s 
postmarital wellbeing, most frequently to the perpetration of severe 
forms of domestic violence. 
Marriage transactions are often not completely rigid, but malleable 
and related to other desired marriage market attributes.  Where the 
young age of a bride is a desirable attribute, poor families may choose 
to marry their daughters early to save on marriage costs.  Similarly, 
unaffordable brideprice expectations may encourage young people to 
pursue relationships and childbearing outside marriage. Marriage-based 
transactions, whether in the form of dowry or brideprice, exacerbate the 
marginalization and exploitation of girls, particularly since both practices 
commoditize or monetize the value of girls. While brideprice appears to 
resemble more directly a transaction of purchasing a girl’s reproductive 
and productive rights, dowry perpetuates the cycle of exploitation as well.
Population Council’s work on marriage transactions 
Population Council programs to prevent child marriage (Amin, Chong, 
and Haberland 2011) usually incorporate asset-building strategies for 
young women through education and livelihoods opportunities for girls. 
Research on the economic dimensions of marriage has informed these 
programming approaches for the wellbeing of girls. Council work on 
child marriage has evolved to incorporate multi-sectoral approaches 
that address the economic considerations of marriage. Given that mar-
riage traditions and cultures, including the characteristics of marriage 
transactions, vary even within country contexts, programmatic ap-
proaches strive to be tailored to specific contexts. Some examples are 
presented below.
Poverty and marriage timing in Nepal
A study using national panel data from Nepal established a clear em-
pirical link between being poor during childhood and getting married in 
early adolescence, rather than being enrolled in school (Bajracharya 
and Amin 2010). Dowry demands have risen in recent years. It is likely 
that this empirical linkage between marriage timing and poverty is medi-
ated by marriage transactions. Instances of high demands for dowry 
and associated disagreements and violence are noted routinely in the 
popular press. However, dowry practices are afforded some legitimacy 
as long-standing traditions, and public critics have occasionally faced 
dire backlash, such as the murder of a radio journalist in southern Terai, 
who is believed to have been killed because of her public pronounce-
ments against dowry. The southern Terai plains of Nepal have some of 
the most excessive dowry demands.
Premarital pregnancy, education, and brideprice in South Africa
The payment of a brideprice (lobola), common in South African mar-
riages, symbolizes the transfer of the right of the girl’s sexual and eco-
nomic services to the husband (Meekers 1992). A study in South Africa 
that examined premarital pregnancy and parenthood during adolescence 
(Kaufman, de Wet, and Stadler 2000) cites lobola as an important fac-
tor in determining marriageability of girls who have had children. On the 
basis of qualitative research, Council researchers concluded that the 
expectation of brideprice may motivate parents to invest in a girl’s edu-
cation and could explain the unusual South African pattern where most 
girls returned to school even after childbirth. Births outside of marriage 
and premarital births during adolescence were also related to lower 
brideprice for girls for their future marriages, giving rise to circumstances 
where premarital births were often kept a secret. 
Transformation of marriage and reproductive behavior in Ghana 
A study by Council researchers on the changing nature of reproductive 
behavior in Ghana examined the role of brideprice in explaining the de-
clining importance of marriage and rising premarital sex and childbearing 
(Mensch et al. 1999). The qualitative results suggested that traditional 
courtship traditions that involved a large brideprice were viewed as a 
burden for young men. Along with the declining practice of female cir-
cumcision, premarital sexual activity had become increasingly common 
and young people’s sexual lives were no longer confined within tradi-
tional marriage. As young couples increasingly exercise control over life 
decisions such as marriage and childbearing, they favor bypassing tradi-
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tional marriage customs, effectively circumventing the financial burden in 
the process. Customary practices of large brideprice are a disincentive 
to formal marriages, and contribute to the erosion of traditional marriage 
and family formation in this region in Ghana. 
Unintended consequences of delaying marriage in Bangladesh
According to DHS data, over 65 percent of women between the ages of 
20 and 24 in Bangladesh are married before 18. In 2001, the Population 
Council partnered with several UN and nongovernmental agencies in 
Bangladesh to design and evaluate a large-scale program for adoles-
cent girls called Kishori Abhijan (Amin and Suran 2005). Kishori Abhijan 
focused on creating safe spaces for girls to socialize and learn, and 
provided training to enhance livelihood skills. The goal was to challenge 
rigid social norms such as early marriage by empowering girls economi-
cally and socially. Monitoring of program components showed that the 
safe spaces and social support components of the program were consis-
tently implemented and well accepted. Livelihoods training, by contrast, 
proved to be expensive and difficult to conduct at scale. Consequently, 
only a fraction of the girls were able to participate in livelihood training. 
An evaluation conducted two years into the program found that although 
marriage was delayed for program participants, dowry payments in-
creased in tandem with age at marriage. In Bangladesh there is a strong 
association between age at marriage and amounts of dowry paid (see 
Figure 1). The program has subsequently attempted to address dowry 
by working with families, but has found it to be an intractable problem. 
While safe spaces and social support programs are successful in delay-
ing marriage, demands for dowry come from the boys and men whom 
the girls marry. In a society where marriage is highly valued and deter-
mines the social and economic status of girls, the rejection of marriage 
prospects because of dowry costs is not an option for most families. 
Data on marriage transactions from survey research 
Notwithstanding these studies, our efforts at understanding marriage 
transactions and the consequences for the wellbeing of girls and 
women have been limited by a lack of data. Nationally representative 
household surveys such as the Living Standards Measurement  
Surveys of the World Bank (LSMS) or the Demographic and Health 
Surveys (DHS) often collect data only on age at marriage and spousal 
characteristics. Among surveys that address marriage and family for-
mation more specifically, a few surveys collect data on a wider variety 
of marriage-related variables. The 2006 World Bank Gender Norms 
Survey in Bangladesh is exemplary in its detailed collection of data  
on marriage characteristics and on marriage transactions (World Bank 
2008). This dataset collects information on several marriage themes  
that researchers agree are instrumental in conducting rigorous empirical 
research on transactions and marriage dynamics. These themes are  
as follows:
1. Arrangement of marriage
2. Spousal choice
3. Asset and wealth differentials between families
4. Presence of village endogamy
5. Patterns in postmarital residence
The World Bank survey is also particularly detailed in its questions 
on marriage transactions in Bangladesh. Themes listed below on mar-
riage transactions are likely to be instrumental in enhancing the under-
standing of the role marriage transactions play in marriage timing and of 
a host of postmarital wellbeing outcomes and status indicators:
1. Whether money and materials were transferred. 
2. The amount of the exchange, monetary or otherwise.
3. Whether the transfers were voluntary or demanded by one family 
from another.
4. How families meet demands (including taking on debt) and  
whether demands exceed what a typical family can pay.
5. Whether negotiations about what and how much is to be  
exchanged occurred and whether a paid middleman was involved.
6. How families acquire financial resources to pay for a dowry or 
brideprice.
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Figure 1   Mean dowry and age at marriage in Bangladesh
From Kishori Abhijan data on girls marrying between 2001 and 2003.
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Researchers at the Population Council have begun taking stock 
of the kinds of quantitative survey data that are available on marriage 
transactions. Recent reviews suggest that large-scale data that address 
these themes and questions do not exist at a national level. Much of the 
research conducted on this topic thus invariably comes from small, local-
ized, and unrepresentative samples, severely reducing the generalizabil-
ity of the findings. Initiatives that drive the collection of such data would 
positively affect studies on marriage transactions at the national level, 
with significant potential for delivering policy-relevant research.
Conclusions
Although the lack of an appropriate evidence base is clearly a hindrance 
to exploring marriage costs fully, this review highlights several important 
aspects of marriage transactions. Our research has shown that in many 
parts of the world, the costs of marriage are drivers of social change. 
Even while practices are widely varied, the consequences for women 
are overwhelmingly negative. As programs to promote healthy transi-
tions to adulthood take root and proliferate in diverse contexts, particular 
manifestations of marriage costs and their correlates need to be taken 
into account, both in terms of understanding change that is already un-
derway, and for designing programs to bring about change.
Some of the examples, such as the experience in Bangladesh, show 
how a nuanced understanding may avoid unintended consequences of 
programs that target a specific practice such as child marriage. The case 
of Nepal emphasizes the importance of targeting the poor, who may be 
more adversely affected by these practices. On the other hand, the spe-
cific norms of exchange in Egypt and Pakistan may have helped to prop 
up traditions of late marriage for women. Processes of development and 
modernization, such as urbanization and migration, may well erode the 
basis of these norms, leading to a downward pressure on age at marriage.
Recent efforts, such as the social norms approach to programming 
promoted by UNICEF, suggest a starting point. Indeed, an important 
contribution is in the naming of the approach and its insistence that 
norms exists and need to be addressed. Without appropriate evidence 
on what the norms are, how they function, and with what consequences, 
however, it is difficult to see how the approach itself would proceed.
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